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Cryopreservation 
In light of recent developments in re-
productive technologies as in vitro fertil-
ization, the development of human 
babies in a scientific lab is plausible. This 
presents many legal, medical and ethical 
questions concerning the rights of the 
unborn and the point at which life is 
considered to begin. 
Approximately one couple in eight is 
classified as infertile. 1 A couple is consid-
ered infertile when they have not used 
contraception and have failed to con-
ceive for at least one year? Further, infer-
tility, especially in women, seems to be 
on the rise because more women are 
postponing having children.3 For those 
women and men who are unable to have 
children due to afflictions such as tubal 
disease, endometriosis, or low sperm 
count, in vitro fertilization (IVF) is the 
ideal means to have children. 
In vitro fertilization duplicates in the 
laboratory the natural process of fertiliza-
tion and development in the fallopian 
tubes.4 The procedure is initiated 
through the use of fertility medications 
to stimulate the development of the egg 
in the female. The eggs are then retrieve~ 
from the ovary5 through a laparoscopy. 
Once the eggs are recovered, they are 
transported to a lab where they are 
placed irl a fluid similar to that in the 
fallopian tubes. The eggs are allowed to 
mature for six hours at which time the 
sperm is irltroduced to the eggs. The egg 
and the sperm are then held irl an incu-
bator for approximately twelve hours in 
order for fertilization to take place. When 
it is determined that the egg has been 
fertilized, it is placed irl a growth media 
and allowed to develop by division until 
it reaches a stage where its size is be-
tween two and eight cells. When it 
reaches this embryo stage, it is removed 
from the media and introduced into the 
uterus of the mother. Prior to the intro-
duction ofthe (now) embryo, progester-
one hormones are administered to the 
mother in order to irlcrease development 
of the uterus lining, making it more re-
ceptive to the embryo? 
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In practice, the number of eggs re-
moved from the female seems to vary. 
One doctor states that he removes an 
average of 5.8 eggs per woman, but notes 
that it is possible to remove as many as 
seventeen eggs at one time.s It has been 
determined that no more than three em-
bryos should be implanted in the mother 
at one time in order to erevent the risks 
of multiple pregnancies? 
Cryoprese1"Vation 
Due to the number of ova which are 
removed from the woman and subse-
quently combined with sperm, the IVF 
process usually results in embryos being 
"left over." Thus, once a woman be-
comes pregnant, the question arises of 
what should be done with the unused 
embryos. Cryopreservation, a method of 
freezing the eggs,IO has become a popu-
lar choice because it saves the cost, time, 
effort, and pain which further 
laparoscopies present. 
However, freezing embryos opens 
legal, medical, and ethical questions con-
cerning their status and rights in our 
society. For example, consider the situa-
tion where a couple divorces while their 
embryos are still in the deep freeze. Who 
should be granted their "custody"? This 
article will analyze the possible legal 
treatment an embryo may receive. It will 
present an analysis of a recent Tennessee 
case which deals with the issue of em-
bryo custody and the inadequacies of its 
holding. This article concludes that em-
bryos are symbolic of potential life and 
should be accorded respect because of 
that potentiality. 
The Status of the Embryo 
There are three main positions which 
are taken in the decision of what rights 
are to be accorded an embryo, whether 
frozen or not. The first argument is that 
embryos are too rudimentary in their 
formation to be accorded any interests or 
rights, and therefore, can be destroyed 
or allowed to die without restriction. The 
second position is the potential life argu-
ment; that is, an embryo, attheveryleast, 
symbolizes a future human being and 
though it is not deserving of the rights 
granted to those living independently of 
the womb, it deserves some respect be-
cause of what it may become. The third 
and fmal position is the one adopted by 
a Tennessee circuit court in Davis v. 
DavisY In Davis, it was held that 
human life begins at conception and em-
bryos should receive all the rights of 
livirlg, breathing human beings. Each of 
these positions is discussed below. 
An Embryo Is Too Rudimentary in 
Its Development To Be Accorded 
Interests or Rights 
It has been judged by the law and by 
the opinion of official bodies that em-
bryos are not yet persons and do not 
deserve the respect accorded persons. 12 
"The human preembryo [is] an entity 
composed of a group of undifferentiated 
cells which have no organs or nervous 
system. ,,13 They are "four celled [enti-
ties]-they haven't developed irlto organs 
or anything. They are too rudimentary to 
have an irlterest in their own right; there-
fore, they can't be harmed, and there 
should be .. nr requirement that ... embryos 
be saved. 1 This argument is the most 
straightforward of the views. 
An Embryo Is Symbolic of Human 
Life and Therefore Maintains a 
Special Status 
To some, the mere existence of an 
embryo does not indicate the existence 
of a human life. In order to develop, the 
embryo must be implanted in a woman's 
womb. 15 The supporters of this second 
argument emphasize the underlying as-
sumption that the embryo, though not 
yet a person, nevertheless has a special 
statyg because it is symbolic of human 
life. 1 Because an embryo is symbolic of 
human life, the destruction of embryos 
may influence the attitudes and treat-
ment of "real" peopleP Thus, in order 
to demonstrate commitment to human 
valuess it is necessary to protect the em-bryO.I Additionally, because the embryo 
is intended to be transferred to a uterus 
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and may eventually come to term, the 
processes used to achieve this result 
could harm it. For these reasons, the 
embryo is entitled to care in order to 
ensure healthy offspring. 19 
An Embryo Is A Person and Enti-
tled To All The Rights and Inter-
ests A Person Has 
The third pOSition, that embryos 
should be granted all the rights and pro-
tections of one living outside the womb, 
results from a close analysis of doctrines 
concerning unborn life. The foundation 
of this argument lies in the rationale be-
hind the Roe v. Wade20 decision. 
Roe v. Wade held that the right to an 
abortion was a constitutionally guaran-
teed right during the first trimester of 
pregnancy.21 This holding was based pri-
marily on a finding that the constitutional 
right to privacy is "broad enough to en-
compass a woman's decision whether or 
not to terminate her pregnancy. "22 Dur-
ing the second trimester the state has the 
power to regulate abortion only to the 
extent necessary for the preservation 
and protection of maternal health.23 It is 
during the third trimester that the state 
develops a compelling interest in the 
protection of potentiallife.24 The state's 
interest becomes compelling during this 
period due to the viability of the fetus. 
Viability is defined as the point at which 
the fetus is "potentially able to live out-
side the mother'S womb, albeit with arti-
ficial aid. ,,25 
Although not stated in Roe, the inter-
est in protecting potential life seems to 
be anchored in the doctrine of parens 
patriae. Parens patriae is a "{t)erm 
[which) refers traditionally to [the) role 
of [the) state as sovereign and guardian 
of persons under legal disability ... a con-
cept of standing utilized to protect those 
quasi-sovereign interests such as health
6 comfort and welfare of the people .... ,,2 
Therefore, as the fetus, which appears to 
be under a legal disability, reaches the 
point of viability, the state acquires a 
compelling interest in the protection of 
the fetus and may prohibit abortion to 
facilitate this protection.27 
Thus, until the third trimester, there is 
no recognition of the fetus as an individ-
ual entity because the fetus is not yet able 
to survive apart from the mother?8 If 
Roe's viability framework were applied 
to the IVF procedure, the embryo "might 
well be analogized to a first trimester 
fetus and thus be subject to a decision 
which terminates its existence ... 29 
Upon closer analysis, this analogy pro-
vides an inadequate basis for determining 
the fate of an embryo for two reasons. 
First, the viability standard cannot logi-
cally be applied to a technology that 
allows an embryo to be sustained indefi-
nitely outside the mother'S body. Sec-
ond, when the embryo is outside of the 
mother'S body, its existence is no longer 
in conflict with her constitutionally pro-
tected privacy interests. 30 Further, as Jus-
tice O'Connor stated in her dissent in 
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health, Inc.,3 1 U[a)s medical sci-
ence becomes better able to provide for 
the separate existence of the fetus, the 
point of viability is moved further back 
toward conception ... 32 Cryopreservation 
technology pushes the point at which a 
fetus is potentially able to live outside the 
womb, albeit with artificial aid,33 to the 
moment of fertilization. 34 
~lCJryopreservation 
pushes the pOint of 
viability back to the 
momento! 
conception. JJ 
"Roe's recognition of a woman's pri-
vacy interest cannot be extended to grant 
a woman, who has donated an egg for 
[IVF1, an absolute right to terminate the 
existence of the reSUlting embryo once 
it has been fertilized and frozen outside 
of her body ... 35 Two facts support this 
conclusion: first, cryopreservation has 
theoretically pushed the point of viability 
back to the point of conception, thereby 
granting the state a compelling interest 
under parens patriae; second, since the 
embryo is no longer connected to the 
mother in any way, she can no longer 
claim a privacy interest in it and execute 
her motherly control over it. 
To summarize, the argument is that the 
possibility that cryopreservation pushes 
the point of viability back to the moment 
of conception combined with the fact 
that the state has a compelling interest in 
protecting a viable, potential human life 
all but grants the embryo full personhood 
status. It is thereby entitled to all the 
rights accorded to living, breathing indi-
viduals. 
The Davjs Quagmire 
Davis v. Dav;s3 presented an interest-
ing arena for the application of these 
theories. This case concerned the dispo-
sition of seven cryogenically stored em-
bryos which were the results of the 
Davis' numerous attempts at preg-
nancy.37 The couple subsequently di-
vorced and each party sought "custody" 
of the embryos. Mrs. Davis sought pos-
session of them in order to make further 
attempts at pregnancy. Mr. Davis, in light 
of their divorced status, did not wish to 
produce children which would grow up 
in a single iarent enVironment, as he 
himself did. Mr. Davis had three alter-
native requests of the court: (1) that joint 
custody of the embryos be granted to the 
parties; (2) that the court prohibit Mrs. 
Davis from using the embryos for implan-
tation until it could decide about their 
disposition; or (3) consider only Mrs. 
Davis for implantation. He opposed de-
struction of the embryos, but preferred 
destruction to allowing their implanta-
tion in anyone but Mrs. Davis. 
Because the Davis situation presented 
two contrary consequences for the em-
bryos,39 in order for the court to deter-
mine who should be granted their 
possession, it first had to determine their 
legal status. 
In deciding what the legal status of the 
embryos was, the court first determined 
that the intent of the Davises was "to 
produce a human being to be known as 
their child. ,,40 The court based its 
custody decision on whether or not the 
couple accomplished this intent.41 In 
order to answer this, it had to answer the 
"most pOignant question of all ... [when) 
does human life begin?..42 To facilitate 
answering this question, it was first nec-
essary to answer other queries such as 
whether the embryos were human and if 
there is a difference ~etween a pre-
embryo and an embryo. 3 In responding 
to these inquiries the court came to the 
conclusion that life begins at conception. 
Therefore, the court held, it was in the 
best interests of the in vitro children, 
under the doctrine of parens patriae, 
that their mother (Mrs. Davis) be permit-
ted to brinR them to term through im-plantation. 
In reaching its conclusion that life be-
gins at conception, the court relied upon 
three different arguments. First, there is 
no such thing as a preembryo. Second, 
cell differentiation had occurred, making 
these entities unique and specialized, 
thereby indicating life. Finally, there was 
no public policy preventing the holding. 
There is No Preembryonic Stage 
At the trial, three experts stated that 
the embryo goes through a number of 
stages in the development toward em-
bryo status: (1) a one cell gamete; (2) a 
zygote stage (after the [rrst cell divides); 
(3) a preembryo (up to 14 days after 
fertilization); and (4) an embryo ~after 14 
days and upon differentiation).4 In con-
tradiction to these opinions, one expert 
stated that each human has a unique 
beginning whi~ occurs at the moment 
of conception. He further stated: 
Preembryo: there is no such word. 
There is no need for subclass of the 
embryo to be called a preembryo, 
because there is nothing before the 
embryo; before an embryo there is 
only a sperm and an egg; when the 
egg is fertilized by the sperm the 
entity becomes a zygote; and wheE 
the zygote divides it is an embryo. 7 
The term preembryo was coined by 
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the Ethics Committee of the American 
Fertility Society (AFS) 48 "in order to avoid 
confusion ....• 49 It is deftned as a "product 
of gametic union from fertilization to the 
appearance of the embryonic axis. The 
preembryonic stage is considered to last 
until 14 days after fertilization ....• 50 The 
AFS committee adopted the view that the 
preembryo deserves respect greater than 
human tissue but not the respect ac-
corded to an actual person. The respect 
is deserved because of the preembryo's 
potential to become a person and be-
cause of the symbolic meaning it has for 
many people.51 The court concluded 
that the preembryo guidelines were 
guidelines for professionals in fertility 
treatment, but held that they did not 
constitute authority for the court and 
therefore could be ignored.52 
The court reduced the entire pre-
embryo analysis down to "much the 
same debate Juliet had with herself when 
she rationalized her strong affection for 
Romeo ... 
Tis but thy name that is my enemy; 
Thou art thyself, though not a 
Montague .... What's in a name? That 
which we call a rose By any other 
name would smell as sweet .... 53 
The court, therefore, refused to recog-
nize a difference between a preembryo 
and an embryo. It then concluded that 
there is no such term as preembryo, hold-
ing that the use of such terms creates a 
false distinction. 54 
While the Romeo and juliet analogy is 
certainly effective and brings the issue 
into perspective, the trial court ignored 
the weight of the evidence. Granted, the 
court was the finder of fact in this non-
jury case. However it was bound to de-
termine the facts by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 55 This preponderance 
standard is amorphous at best. It allows 
the court to hold any way it desires and 
say the holding is suppo~d by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. It seems in the 
Davis context that the preponderance of 
the evidence was in the direction oppo-
site the final holding. Mr. Davis presented 
three eminent expert witnesses in the 
field, all whose opinions were backed by 
the Ethics Committee of the AFS. Yet, the 
court followed the more emotionally 
evocative opinion of the minority of ex-
perts. 
Cell Differentiation Occurred 
The court also accepted evidence that 
DNA manipulation of the molecules of 
human chromosomes reliably proved 
cell differentiation. 57 The uniqueness of 
character,58 demonstrated through dif-
ferentiation, enables scientists to distin-
guish one zygote (embryo) from 
another. 59 Using these distinguishing 
characteristics, the court found th~ 
unique individuals were in existence, 
giving further credence to the holding 
that life begins at conception and that 
embryos are living human beings. 
At trial, two experts testified that the 
preembryo is not a being because it has 
no observable grgans, body parts nor 
nervous system. 1 A third expert testified 
that "a man is a man; that upon fertiliza-
tion, the entire constitution of the man is 
clearly, unequivocally spelled out [in the 
DNA molecules); that upon inspection 
via DNA manipulation, one can see the 
life codes for each of these otherwise 
unobservable elements of the unique in-
~lUJpon 
fertilization . .. the 
entire constitution 
of the man is 
clearly, 
unequivocally 
spelled out [in the 
DNA molecules.]n 
dividual. ,,62 This testimony stood un-
rebutted in t~e record and was accepted 
by the court. 3 
In retrospect, howeve:r, the evidence 
of differentiation via DNA manipulation 
should not have been accepted by the 
court because it is essentially hearsay. 
"DNA examination is highly technical, 
incapable of observation by the Court 
and requires the Court to either accept 
or reject the scJ.[ntist's conclusion that it 
can be done." The court took the ex-
pert at his word and did not require any 
proof as to its veracity. Because this was 
such a controversial issue at the trial, it 
was all the more necessary that the court 
insist on proof of the validity. 
Through the above reasoning, the 
court concluded that life begins at con-
ception and that the Davises had accom-
plished their intent of producing a 
human being known as their child. How-
ever, after holding that life begins at con-
ception, the court had to get around 
already existing laws which do not grant 
an embryo such an elevated status, such 
as ~e Tennessee Wrongful Death Stat-
ute 5 and th~ Tennessee Criminal Abor-
tion Statute. Under the wrongful death 
statute, an unborn chil~ is accorded sta-
tus only if it is viable 7 at the time of 
death. The abortion statute essentially 
affords the embryo no status whatsoever 
during the fIrst trimester. Faced with 
these hurdles, the court chose to frame 
the issue very specifically. It asked, 
"[w)hat .. .is the legal status to be ac-
corded a human being existing as an 
embryo, in vitro, in 1kdivorce case in the 
state of Tennessee?" 
In answering the above question, the 
court noted that no state in the Union had 
established a policy which declares the 
rights to be accorded a hurgan embryo, 
in vitro, in a divorce case. 9 In ftnding 
that, for domestic relations purposes, no 
public policy prevented the continuing 
development of the common law as it 
may specifically apply to "the seven 
human beings existing as embryos in 
vitro, in this domestic relations case. The 
court [was] of the opinion ... the age old 
common law doctrine of parens patriae 
controls these children .... ,,70 The court 
reached this conclusion through a discus-
sion of Smith v. Gore,71 a Tennessee case 
which discussed the great value the state 
places on human life. It further took care-
ful note that it is the legislature's right to 
set public policy and the court's respon-
sibility to ftnd that no "public policy pre-
vents the continuing development of 
common law."n 
The Problems the Davis Holding 
Presents and Resolution 
The decision in Davis, as it stands, is 
fraught with problems. Reaching a legal 
determination that life begins at concep-
tion will have a great impact not only on 
IVF, but on society as a whole. This hold-
ing, if affirmed, could cause immediate 
and harmful restrictions on the IVF and 
cryopreservation processes. In addition, 
the potential effect of this decision on 
abortion doctrines is staggering. While 
this article does not support Franken-
stein·like experimentation, society will 
feel the ripples of this decision well into 
the next century. 
In terms of the rationale of the deci-
sion, the argument that there is no such 
thing as a pre embryo goes against the 
weight of the evidence. The court's blind 
reliance on cell differentiation is very 
weak proof that the Davises created a 
human being. "Human" is "of, relating to, 
or characteristic of man or having 
human form or attributes.,,'?3 "Being" is 
deftned as "existence, the qualities of an 
existent thing, a living thing .... " 74 An em-
bryo in the process of cryopreservation 
is frozen and does not show the qualities 
of a living thing. As seen by a layperson, 
not only are the embryos not character-
istic of man, they are not in existence. 
In light of the weaknesses of this opin-
ion, there are many other avenues that 
could have been followed, producing the 
same results, which would not have been 
as far reaching as that taken by the Davis 
court. For example, the catch point of 
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the Davis decision seemed to be what to 
call these "entities": zygote, preembryo, 
or embryo? Once this was established, 
everything seemed to fall into place. 
However, the issue is not what to call 
these entities, but what their status is. 
These embryos (for lack of a more imag-
inative term) are frozen at the two, four 
or eight cell stage?5 And while it is unde-
niable that they are of human origin, at 
this point the chances of their resulting 
in a term pregnancy are slim.70 
The Davis decision places severe lim-
itations on the potential growth and de-
velopment of these embryos. To hold 
that life begins at conception, thereby 
giving these cryogenically-stored em-
bryos full personhood status, places too 
many constraints on science and society. 
If these embryos are to be granted full 
personhood status, this would mean that 
there could be no waste of the embryos 
and the parties responsible would be 
liable for any waste be it accidental or 
purposeful. 
For example, if embryos were granted 
full personhood status, this would mean 
that all frozen embryos would have to be 
implanted in a woman. Usually the lon-
gevity of c9;0genically stored embryos is 
two years. Full personhood status lim-
its science because it reduces the num-
ber of ova which can be removed from a 
woman for the fear of being wasteful. 
This, in turn, reduces the chances of 
successful in vitro reproduction, 
thereby increasing the number of 
laparoscopies necessary to be performed 
to obtain more eggs. These painful, re-
peated, unnecessary (in light of the 
cryopreservation technology), and 
costly attempts could all cause someone 
to be less than willing to utilize these 
methods. 
Futhermore, if all the embryos are to 
be implanted, are there going to be 
enough women willing to undergo the 
process and accept children who are not 
theirs genetically? This is all the more 
difficult because the majority of women 
and men reproduce coitally. For those 
who do choose non-coital reproduction, 
it is only natural for them to want chil-
dren with their "own" genes. 
Consider also the liabilities that would 
be imposed on the medical profession. 
At this point in time, these processes are 
still in developmental stages. Through 
ignorance, mistakes are easily made. If 
such a strict standard is accepted, few 
professionals are going to be willing to 
undertake scientific exploration at the 
risk of their careers. 
However, to say that an embryo is too 
rudimentary to be accorded any interests 
at all is equally unappealing because it 
does have the ability to grow into a 
human being. Our society places a very 
high value on life. In the Davis context, 
to permit the disposal of these embryos 
where a party has no further use for them 
is disrespectful of their potential. The 
Davis court could have reached the same 
result (Mrs. Davis being granted custody 
of the embryos) without placing such a 
high burden on SOciety. It could have 
decided that these embryos should be 
given the chance to grow, not because 
their life has begun, but out of respect for 
what they may become. 
The best position for society to adopt 
would be a middle-of-the-road position 
that the embryos are representative of 
potential life and are therefore entitled to 
a certain measure of respect. This posi-
tion would grant science and society the 
most flexibility while avoiding the wan-
ton wastefulness which so many fear. 
In conclUSion, the cryopreservation 
technique presents us with a veritable 
quagmire of medical, legal, and ethical 
dilemmas, as manifested in the Davis 
opinion. To go to extremes in determin-
ing the status of the frozen embryo is 
either too constraining on science and 
society or a wanton disregard for life. For 
these reasons, the Davis embryos and 
others in that position should be treated 
with the utmost respect and care, not for 
what they are, but for what they could 
be. 
[Subsequent to the writing of this 
paper, the Tennessee appellate court re-
versed the trial court's custody award of 
the embryos to Mrs. Davis and granted 
the parties joint control "ofthe fertilized 
ova ... with an equal voice over their dis-
position." 78 An analysis of this decision 
shows that the court based its opinion on 
the potential for life which the embryos 
possess?9] 
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capable of natural conception. IVF 
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provided the only option with which 
they could have children. The couple 
made six attempts to have a child 
through the IVF process and then tem-
porarily stopped. In 1988, they learned 
of a cryopreservation program and de-
cided to enter. On December 8, 1988, 
nine ova were removed from Mrs. 
Davis. These ova were inseminated with 
Mr. Davis' sperm, producing acceptable 
zygotes. These zygotes were permitted 
to mature and two of the resulting em-
bryos were implanted in Mrs. Davis_ No 
pregnancy resulted. The remaining 
seven embryos were placed in cryo-
genic storage for future implantation. 
Id. at 2098. 
38Id. at 2108. 
39If Mrs. Davis was to get possession of 
the embryos it is presumed that they 
would be implanted and would "live." 
If Mr. Davis was to receive custody, it is 
more likely that they would never be 
given an opportunity for implantation 
and would be allowed to die. 
4oDavis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. at 2099. 
4 lId. 
42Id. 
43Id. Based on expert testimony of five 
Witnesses, the court found that the 
seven cryogenically-preserved embryos 
were human. 
44Id. at 2097. 
45Id. at 2100. 
46Id. 
47Id. 
4Brhis word was used in a report of the 
AFS entitled Ethical Considerations of 
the New Reproductive Technologies. It 
appears in the Sept. 1986 (vol. 46, No. 
t1 publication of Fertility and Sterility. 
Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. at 2100. 
50I d. 
5 lId. 
52I d. at 2101. This finding was further 
bolstered by the fact that the only time 
the experts who supported the exis-
tence of a preembryonic stage actually 
used the term was in their testimony. 
This term was not used in their notes or 
scholarly articles. Id. 
53Id. 
54Id. 
55Id. at 2105. 
56In Appendix A to its opinion the court 
stated that: 
[T]he court is bound to determine 
the facts by what the law perceives 
to be the "preponderance of the 
evidence," which means that 
amount of factual information pre-
sented to the Court during the 
course of the trial which is sufficient 
to cause it to believe that the matter 
being asserted is probably true. In 
order to preponderate, the evi-
dence must have the greater con-
vincing effect in the formation of the 
belief about the facts .... Davis, 15 
Fam. L. Rep. at 2105. 
57Differentiate: to distinguish by a spe-
cific difference; develop differential 
characteristics or forms; to acquire a 
distinct character. Davis, 15 Fam. L. 
Rep. at 2101 n.36. 
58Id. at 2102. 






65Tenn. Code Ann. §20-5-106(b) (l989). 
66renn. Code Ann. §39-15-201(c) (1-3) 
(1989). 
67 See supra notes 25-29 and accompa-
nying text. 
6sDavis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. at 2103. 
69Id. The court discussed the fact that 
Roe v. Wade and Webster v. Reproduc-
tive Health Services, 492 u.S. 490 
(1989), were inapplicable to this situa-
tion. 
70Id. 
71728 S.W.2d 738 (1987). 
72Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. at 2103. 
73The Merriam-Webster Dictionary 
(4th ed. 1976). 
741d. 
75Wurmbrand, supra note 8, at 1083. 
76Pregnancy ratios resulting from in· 
vitro fertilization: 
When 1 embryo is implanted = 10% 
When 2 embryos are implanted = 25% 
When 3 embryos are implanted = 35-
40% 
Dickey, supra note 1, at 331. 
77Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. at 2111. 
78Davis v. Davis, 16 Fam. L. Rep. 1535, 
1536 (fenn. Ct. App. decided Sept. 13, 
1990). 
79Id. 
Julia Minner graduated from the Uni-
versity of Baltimore School of Law in 
1990 and is currently the Judicial Law 
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